3. Country Background

3.1 Political, Economic and Social Aspects Relevant for PSB

BiH’s political, economic, and social context is defined by its post-socialist and post-conflict nature, power-sharing state structures, and dire economic circumstances. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia, the country was subjected to international intervention, which considered media sector reform a key in the peace building and democratization processes.^[41] These efforts were met with resistance from ethno-nationalist politicians in the country who most often formally agreed to the new models and ideas, but obstructed their implementation.

One of the particularly salient factors in BiH’s political context is the consociational power-sharing structure imposed by the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP).^[42] Critics of the GFAP argue that this constitutional arrangement excludes citizens based on ethnicity^[43] by enshrining the three ‘constituent peoples’ (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs) while excluding ‘Others’ (Roma, Jews, Bosnians,^[44] the undeclared, and others) from political representation.^[45] Many scholars argue that this arrangement petrifies an “increasingly dysfunctional political system.”^[46] Paradoxically, power-sharing principles based on consociationalism have failed to foster democracy. Instead of addressing past conflicts, the categorization of the Bosnian citizenry along ethnic lines (correlated with religion and language) simply institutionalizes ethnic factionalism. Unlike more successful consociational societies in Western Europe, BiH’s constitutional structure “pits individual rights against the collective premises of the consociational structures” and offers limited incentives for institutional change.^[47] Indeed, the failure of the consociational model in creating the conditions for a robust democracy in BiH is mirrored in the collapse of the PSB system.

Like other countries in the region, the political context of BiH is dominated by political capture of the state. In BiH, these political elites most often belong to ethnically defined political parties, which purport to serve as ‘guardians’ of national interest for their own groups. Divisions and disagreements among dominant political parties have repeatedly stalled the implementation of even the most basic reforms, including the implementation of laws pertaining to the public service media. Consequently, Freedom House’s Nation in Transit report for 2016 considers BiH a hybrid regime, caught in transition between a consolidated democracy and authoritarianism.^[48] The report blames the “excruciatingly complex political system” resulting from the Dayton Agreement, which “has crippled the state” and led to the country operating as “a set of ethnic fiefdoms.”^[49]

Many scholars agree that ethnic identity and nationalism are utilized by political elites to “obscure the process of economic dispossession”^[50] of the populace. Ruling parties in BiH demonstrate characteristics of what Mujkić calls “a democracy of ethnic oligarchies.”^[51] Corrupt oligarchs are, by definition, parasitic upon public institutions and thus “have no potential to be democratic agents.”^[52] Within this milieu PSB flounders against oligarchic interests, which have no endogenous incentive for empowering an independent PSB system. Deliberate backpedaling about PSB’s proper implementation and development thus undermines its proper democratic and cohesive function. Likewise, parties face insufficient exogenous incentives for PSB reform. While PSB and free media are nominally conditions for EU accession, international actors such as the EU are, on the whole, unwilling to challenge political elites or demand accountability,^[53] exacerbating the stagnation and politicization of PSB. What is lacking is more robust support for democratization and civic action which would transform the very structure that sustains the ethnopolitical elites and fails to incentivize political will for supporting truly public and functioning PSB.

BiH’s economic situation has had negative consequences for PSB, as well as on the political stalemate that has existed for several years. Bosnia and Herzegovina has one of Europe’s highest unemployment rates – 27.5% in 2014,^[54] while youth unemployment was 58% in 2016.^[55] BiH is ranked as the fifth poorest country in Europe by the World Bank,^[56] while according to EU statistical office Eurostat Bosnia is the poorest European country measured by GDP per capita, and second poorest measured by Actual Individual Consumption (AIC). Bosnia is at the bottom of the list with GDP per capita of only 28 percent of the European average, and an AIC which is 37 percent of the European average. Some argue that within the complex governmental structure, partisan conflicts have “affected living conditions,” with enormous debts growing “as budget funds were sunk in corruption or used to buy social peace at the expense of investment.”^[57] As the World Bank estimates, various factors – such as political and social turmoil, lack of progress in making improvements to the business climate – reduced economic growth rates. Critics have pointed to rapid post-war privatization and deregulation as evidence of the predatory actions of local political elites whose pillage of state assets began during the war.^[58]

Prominent local critics of post-war transition in post Yugoslav countries point to regional patterns of “general impoverishment, huge public and private indebtedness…widespread deindustrialization, social degradation, depopulation through diminished life expectancy and emigration, and general unemployment.”^[59] These patterns are all visible in BiH. According to the first postwar census (though its results were contested)^[60] from 2013, the population has declined by 20 percent in the past 25 years,^[61] the biggest drop in Bosnia for more than a century, and the largest decline in the region. Overall, 3.52 million people live in Bosnia today, which is some 875,000 fewer than in 1991, with many assumed to have emigrated for better economic opportunities. These economic and social conditions have recently been the subject of protest and citizens’ dissatisfaction: in 2014, waves of social protests were sparked in numerous places in BiH, led by workers from privatized and destroyed factories. They demanded unpaid salaries and pensions, and were soon joined by students and other citizens, resulting in three month-long protests and demands for resignations of political elites.^[62]

3.2 Media System Overview

The media system in Bosnia mirrors the ethnic polarization and territorial fragmentation of the country, and suffers from the same problems of economic hardship and politicization. Its development was highly influenced by the 1992-1995 war, and deep reforms in the post-war period that were guided by the international community.^[63] According to Freedom House, in 2015 the media market in BiH was “overcrowded; divided along ethnic, entity, and party lines; marked by close relationships among publishers, journalists, and politicians; and characterized by a dearth of independent reporting” while the public broadcasting content “reflects the fact that their funding depends on the whims of politicians.”^[64]

It is therefore not surprising that some of the most relevant international rankings rating the situation of media democratization and professionalism in the country are showing continuous decline in the last decade. For example, the Freedom House scores for Independent Media (as well as overall state of democracy) in BiH have been steadily dropping since 2006.^[65] Similarly, the IREX Media Sustainability Index for Bosnia and Herzegovina shows a decline in the development of a sustainable media system in BiH since 2006 and stagnation in the past few years.^[66] According to the same source, the media are under political influence, reporting is biased, and media laws are poorly implemented.^[67] Freedom of speech and good business management scores also dropped in 2015 compared to the previous year due to threats to journalists, political and economic instability, and decreasing revenue sources.^[68] The country’s media system is considered to be ‘an unsustainable mixed system.’^[69]^[a]

The broadcasting market in BiH is oversaturated given the limited revenues available. The 2015 CRA report counts 43 TV and 145 radio stations, plus three public broadcasters - one for each entity (Radio-Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina [RTVFBiH], Radio-Television of Republika Srpska [RTRS]) and one at state-level (Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina [BHRT]). An important aspect of the broadcast media market is that there are five public TV stations at the cantonal level in Federation BiH, and seven radio and TV stations at the municipal level, all financed by government, with an estimated cost of 7.87 million EUR per year.^[70] According to the IREX MSI report:

“when it comes to government funding for media, data collected by Association CRMA in 2015 showed that around $16.36 million is provided by the government on different administrative levels, in the form of direct funding from government budgets, subsidies or different contracts with media (for covering certain events, advertising, etc.). The current models of government financing lack credible criteria, transparency, independent decision-making and overall guaranties of editorial independence, and thus are believed to be primarily a means of control over media.”^[71]

The size of the radio and TV market is hard to establish due to fragmentation and a lack of reliable media marketing research, reliable audience measurement, or a database with updated information. The CRA is one of the only bodies that analyze the broadcasting market, and in the last available report from 2013, the size of BiH’s media market was assessed at 156.5 million KM in 2012.^[72] According to the CRA report, 70% of the total revenue of the electronic media market in 2012 (app. 90 million KM in total) in BiH goes to public service broadcasters, while 35.4% or 19.63 million KM (out of the total marketing revenue of television, print, radio, and online marketing) goes to public broadcasters, which is relatively large compared to other countries in Europe.^[73] According to the OSCE, public service broadcasters should not have more than 25% marketing income as they should not be in direct competition with private media for these revenues.^[74]

Moreover, due to the recent financial crisis, advertising money in the media market as a whole is decreasing, and “considered to be far less than required for healthy functioning of the media sector.”^[75] Data from Fabrika advertising agency in Sarajevo claims that advertising in the country peaked in 2008, after which the decline in advertising revenue tracked closely with the global recession.^[76]

Private broadcasters are increasingly becoming competitors of PSBs in terms of primetime news,^[77] but often even in other segments. While audience shares for commercial broadcasters have demonstrated a growing trend, audience shares for PSBs, excluding RTRS, have been falling in the past two years.^[78] Analysts from the media watchdog portal Analiziraj.ba, who make weekly assessments of programs of major TV stations in the country, including public broadcasters, have observed that currently commercial TV stations are leading in the production of children’s programs and cultural programs,^[79] and they are also catching up with PSBs when it comes to informational services.^[80] From PSB data, it is clear that PSBs are lagging behind when it comes to cultural and children’s programs. For example, in 2015 only 3% of BHRT’s programming was children’s broadcasting and 6% cultural. RTRS, in 2014, had 4% children’s programming and 6% cultural shows.^[81]

The advent of new media platforms, such as cable and Internet protocol television (IPTV), online media, and social media platforms are disrupting the media market in a profound way. Mobile phone penetration in BiH has been rising, reaching 87.85% by 2014.^[82] According to Internet World Statistics, at the end of 2015 there were 2,628,846 Internet users, a 68.1% penetration. The same source suggests 1,400,000 Facebook users on June 30/16, or 46.1% penetration rate.^[83] IREX notes that “users tend to rely increasingly on social networking tools for news,”^[84] especially young people. However, television remains the main source of news in BiH – a 2016 EBU infographic demonstrated that Bosnians watch the most television in Europe – on average 5 hours and 4 minutes a day.^[85]

3.3 PSB in BiH: Context, Establishment, Development and Obstacles

The end of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina left the media landscape entirely divided along ethnic lines. In Republika Srpska, the state controlled broadcaster SRT (Srpska Radio Televizija) was under direct control of the ruling SDS party. In the Bosniak part of the Federation of BiH, Sarajevo-based RTVBIH was controlled by the SDA Bosniak ruling party, while areas of the Federation under the Croat HDZ party control had EROTEL TV, as well as illegal re-broadcasting of programs of the Croatian national broadcaster HRT (Hrvatska Radio-Televizija/Croatian Radio-Television) across the BiH territory. All of these media houses continued to use war rhetoric and hate speech even after the peace accord was signed, undermining the prospects of democratization and peace implementation in the country.

The reform of state controlled broadcasters was high on the peace implementation agenda when the Peace Implementation Council (representing the international community) introduced media reforms in 1997.^[86] The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was given powers “to curtail or suspend” any media network or program thought to be working contrary to the Dayton Peace Accords, which opened the door for direct intervention in the media system. The first significant action was in 1997, when SFOR^[87] troops forcibly took over the transmitters of Republika Srpska’s public television network^[88] in order to put an end to the inflammatory broadcasting which was thought to imperil the peace implementation process. This in turn enabled more direct intervention in media reform on the part of OHR. In 1998, the OHR called for the creation of the public service broadcasting system – or rather, the transformation of government-controlled broadcasters in each entity into a functioning PSB and the establishment of a state-wide public service broadcaster as well.^[89] At this point, both the OHR and European donor states involved in BiH were “fervent in [their] support for the development of PSB, especially for the creation of a state-wide public service broadcaster.”^[90] The crucial point came in 2002 when OHR introduced by a decree a set of laws formally establishing the PSB system in BiH. After 2003, the OHR’s involvement in PSB was reduced as the European Commission took the lead, making the establishment of a functional PSB system a condition for EU accession. Consequently, in 2005, changing the PSB legal framework was made an official condition for signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and BiH.^[91] Since then, the process has been in the hands of the political elites of BiH, which has arguably led to strife and stagnation, as elaborated below.

3.3.1 PSB Organization

The organizational structure of the PSB system in BiH is a prime example of the failure of an ideal model in practice. According to the current legal framework, the Public Broadcasting System of BiH includes one national and two entity broadcasters:

The state-level public broadcaster of BiH (BHRT), consisting of one television channel (BHT) and one radio channel (BH Radio 1).^[92]
Radio-Television of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina (RTVFBiH), consisting of one TV channel (FTV) and two radio channels (Radio FBiH and Radio 202).^[93]
Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska (RTRS),^[94] consisting of one TV channel and one radio channel.^[95]

The law also prescribes the existence of a fourth unit – the Corporation – as an umbrella organization to manage equipment, set the development strategy, coordinate the technical and human potential of the three broadcasters, and collect all advertising revenues and license fees and distribute them among the broadcasters in accordance using a predefined formula.^[96]

Such a model was meant to replicate the BBC model, and was proposed by a BBC consultancy team that was involved in the early process of transformation. The BBC model operates in “an internal market among PSB units, where all the services would be purchased between the units, thus making the production more cost-effective and the system more accountable.”^[97] The involvement of BBC experts was part of the international intervention spearheaded by OHR, and local media experts were hardly consulted in the process.^[98]

Figure 1: The Structure of the PSB System of BiH^[99]

When it comes to their internal structure, the Public Service Broadcasting System includes the System Board, consisting of 12 members: four from the Supervisory Boards of each of the three broadcasters. The System Board is in charge of the coordination of the system in terms of program scheme, proposing the amount of RTV license fee, etc. The System Board, at least formally, also performs as a Supervisory Board to the joint Corporation of the PSB System and adopts codes of conduct referring to the entire PSB System.

All three broadcasters – BHT, RTRS and RTVFBiH – have a Supervisory Board and Managing Board. The BHT Managing Board consists of the Director General who supervises the daily operations of BHT, while the Supervisory Board is focused on programming and is in charge of supervising the performance of BHT in general. The Supervisory Board consists of four people – one from each of the three constituent peoples (Serbs, Bosniaks, Croats), and one representing "Others". The Parliamentary Assembly of BiH selects these members after receiving a list from the Communications Regulatory Agency with names of suggested candidates. RTRS and RTVFBiH have the same bodies but unlike BHT, their Managing Boards “are not required to have equal representation of all constituent peoples.”^[100]

However, the fourth organizational unit of the PSB system, the Corporation, was never established. The inability to create the Corporation has been blamed partly on obstruction by political parties, given that the establishment of the Corporation would have eventually led to the creation of a unified system, with minimal possibility for political or economic influence. However, resistance to its establishment is also present on the part of the entity-level broadcasters. Given the redistribution of earnings envisaged by the Corporation, it is neither in the interest of RTVFBiH nor of RTRS, who would both lose a significant segment of the revenues from advertising they earn through the transfers to BHRT. Moreover, the Corporation would gain ownership of the equipment, which is also not in the interest of individual broadcasters, particularly those that are better equipped. In effect, the PSB system was never truly established in its envisaged form – instead, the three broadcasters act like competitors rather than partners who belong to the same organizational structure.

TOP

[1] Elvir Pelešević, **ENG ** “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Parliament Secures BHRT’s Survival … so far,” Eurovisionary, June 15, 2016.

[2] Katrin Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans: Lost between Models and Realities (Sarajevo: Analitika - Center for Social Research, 2013), p. 25.

[3] Jan Zielonka and Paolo Mancini, Executive Summary: A Media Map of Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2011).

[4] European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Vision 2020: Connecting to a Networked Society (Geneva: EBU, May 20, 2012).

[5] Jackie Harrison and Bridgette Wessels, “A New Public Service Communication Environment? Public Service Broadcasting Values in the Reconfiguring Media”, New Media & Society 7, no. 6 (2005), p. 834.

[6] Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Johannes Bardoel, eds. From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media (Göteborg: Nordicom, 2007), p. 9.

[7] EBU, Vision 2020, p. 85.

[8] Karen Donders and Hilde Van den Bulck, “‘The Digital Argument’ In Contemporary Public Service Media Debates: The Case Of New Management Contract Negotiations for VRT,” in The Value of Public Service Media, eds. Gregory Ferrell Lowe and Fiona Martin (Gothenburg: Nordicom, 2014), p. 147.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Slavko Splichal, “Rethinking Publicness: The Precedence of the Right to Communicate”, Javnost - The Public 9, no. 3 (2002), p. 100.

[11] Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and Deliberation”, Political Communication 22, no. 2 (2005), p. 148.

[12] Tobias Olsson, “There is No Public Sphere without a Public: An Interview with Slavko Splichal.” Mediální studia 4, no. 1 (2010), p. 68.

[13] Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans, p. 20.

[14] Ibid.

[15] EBU, Vision 2020, p. 10.

[16] Ibid, p. 1.

[17] Paolo Mancini, “Media Fragmentation, Party System, and Democracy”, The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, no. 1 (2013), pp. 43-60.

[18] Ibid, p. 50.

[19] Some analysts in the UK fear that the BBC license fee system cannot survive and that the license fee funding system is “‘likely to become less sustainable’ and would have to be overhauled entirely.” For example, in Finland the license fee has become a means of income tax, similar in some ways to the French system for funding PSB. In Germany the license fee was found to have lost its constitutional legitimacy and has been transformed into a household tax, and in the Netherlands the license fee was shifted to taxation some years ago.

[20] Ferrell Lowe and Bardoel, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, p. 11.

[21] European Commission, Public Service Broadcasting and State Aid – Frequently Asked Questions, MEMO/05/73 (Brussels: European Commission, March 3, 2005).

[22] Karen Donders and Caroline Pauwels, “Does EU Policy Challenge the Digital Future of Public Service Broadcasting?: An Analysis of the Commission's State Aid Approach to Digitization and the Public Service Remit of Public Broadcasting Organizations”, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 14, no. 3 (2008), p. 297.

[23] Public value tests are one form of test which seeks to measure the justification of the use of state funds to fund PSBs – they can be found in the UK, Germany, and Norway. The EU calls for an ‘ex ante test’ any time a PSB remit is sought to be expanded, including “a public consultation which assesses—prior to their introduction—whether ‘significant new audiovisual services envisaged by public service broadcasters serve the democratic, social and cultural needs of the society, while duly taking into account its potential effects on trading conditions and competition’.” Thus many of these tests include considerations both of the public value of PSBs and of their effects on the market and their own economic efficiency. Citation from Hallvard Moe, “Governing Public Service Broadcasting: “Public Value Tests” in Different National Contexts”, Communication, Culture & Critique 3, no. 2 (2010), p. 210.

[24] Ferrell Lowe and Bardoel, From Public Service Broadcasting to Public Service Media, p. 16.

[25]Annika Sehl, Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Alessio Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media (Oxford: Reuters Institute for Journalism, 2016).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Public Service Media Governance (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, February 15, 2012).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Michal Glowacki, “Governance of Public Service Media in Poland: the Role of the Public”, Media and Communication 3, no. 4 (2015), p. 26.

[30] Florian Bieber argues that in South Eastern Europe, “democratic formalities [are] observed, but at the same time, populist parties control the state through patronage structures. This is particularly evident through the dominance of political parties over the media, the state and the weak rule of law.” Florian Bieber, “The Authoritarian Temptation”, Florianbieber.org, March 15, 2014.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, eds., Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 3.

[33] Thanks to Davor Marko in helping the authors make this point.

[34] Karol Jakubowicz, “Public Service Broadcasting: Product (and Victim?) of Public Policy” in Handbook on Global Media and Communication Policy, ed. Robin Mansell and Marc Raboy (Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley, 2011), p. 215.

[35] Voltmer corroborates the politicization of the public media in post-communist settings: “In many new democracies of post-communist Eastern Europe, public service has been hijacked by political elites to serve their needs of controlling the public agenda.” Voltmer, Building Media, p. 25.

[36] Ivan Berend and Bojan Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe: Transition from Communism to Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of Contemporary History 50, no. 4 (2015), p. 779.

[37] Ibid, p. 780.

[38] Cambridge Dictionary, definition of “crony capitalism”.

[39] Please see the Annex for the full list of those interviewed.

[40] One of the editors we contacted, informed of the international character of the research project, rejected the interview stating that “the international community” is partially to be blamed for the situation PSB in Bosnia is in.

[41] Tarik Jusić and Nidžara Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention: International Media Assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒ Center for Social Research, 2013).

[42] Colloquially referred to as the Dayton Agreement since it was signed in the US military base in Dayton, Ohio, USA.

[43] Edin Hodžić and Nenad Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒ Center for Social Research, 2011).

[44] In BiH, citizens who choose to identify as ‘Bosnian’ rather than one of the three ethnic identities are in the minority and are not structurally validated by the country’s constitutional structure. In the 2013 census, those who identified themselves as Bosnian were lumped into the category of ‘Other’ – along with Roma, Jews, those of other religious identities, and the undefined.

[45] Hodžić and Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering.

[46] Ismet Sejfija and Danica Fink-Hafner, “Citizens’ Protest Innovations in a Consociational System: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Teorija in Praksa 53, no. 1 (2016), p. 197.

[47] Ibid, p. 186.

[48] Dino Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Freedom House, 2016.

[49] Ibid, p. 11.

[50] Jasmin Mujanović, “The Baja Class and the Politics of Participation”, in Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons, ed. Damir Arsenijević (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), p. 138.

[51] Asim Mujkić, “We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis”, Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007), p. 113.

[52] Mujanović, “The Baja Class”, p. 138.

[53] “The unwillingness of international actors (later the architects of the post-war settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina), from the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, to promote and implement decisions and policies that would foster meaningful democratic accountability of elites, participatory civic engagement and the creation of a robust minority rights regime rather than exclusionary ethno-chauvinism.” Mujanović, “The Baja Class.”

[54] Mirna Jusić and Amar Numanović, Flexible Labour in Inflexible Environment: Reforms of Labour Market Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Comparative Perspective (Sarajevo: Analitika ‒Center for Social Research, 2015).

[55] Ages 15-24. Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016.”

[56] “Bosna i Hercegovina peta najsiromašnija država u Evropi” [Bosnia and Herzegovina the Fifth Poorest Country in Europe], Klix.ba, February 22, 2016. See also: World Bank, “Poverty and Equity, Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 2016.

[57] Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016”.

[58] Srećko Horvat and Igor Štiks, Welcome to the Desert of Post-Socialism: Radical Politics after Yugoslavia (London: Verso Books, 2015), p.2.

[59] Ibid.

[60] See: Samir Huseinović, “Politiziranje popisa stanovništva u BiH” [Politicizing the census in BiH] Deutsche Welle, April 4, 2016; Charles Recknagel, “Bosnia Erupts in Feuding over New Census Data”, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 30, 2016.

[61] Agency of Statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Census of Population, Households, and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013: Final Results (Sarajevo: Agency of Statistics for Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2016).

[62] Srećko Horvat, “Godot Arrives in Sarajevo”, New York Times, February 19, 2014.

[63] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 15.

[64] Jahić, “Nations in Transit 2016”.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Sanela Hodžić and Lidija Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Media Sustainability Index 2016 (Washington: IREX, 2016).

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Sanela Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report: State-media Financial Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Southeastern Europe Media Observatory, November 26, 2015.

[71] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[72] Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRA), Analiza tržišta emitovanja u BiH [Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH] (Sarajevo: CRA, 2013).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[76] Radenko Udovičić, Working Conditions for Journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Journalists in a Gap between Devastated Media and Legal Insecurity (Sarajevo, 2015).

[77] Mehmed Halilović, long-time journalist and media analyst, former media ombudsman, interview with author, March 2016.

[78] Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska (RTRS), Izvještaj o poslovanju RTRS-a [Report on the Work of RTRS]” (Banja Luka: Radio-Television of the Republika Srpska, 2014), p. 34; Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BHRT), Izvještaj o radu i poslovanju Radiotelevizije Bosne i Hercegovine za 2015. godinu [Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015] (Sarajevo, March 2016), p.16.

[79] Brought to our attention by Gordana Katana, journalist, and Uglješa Vuković, Media analyst, interviews with author, March 2016. See also archives at http://www.analiziraj.ba, accessed 28 April 2017.

[80] In a small research project done by Media Plan, approx. 40% of students in Sarajevo and Mostar perceived the role of N1, a private media company, as essentially providing the functions of a public service broadcaster. Radenko Udovičić, interview with author, April 2016.

[81] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS.

[82] Invest in Group, “Sarajevo Calling”, March 2015.

[83] “Europe – Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Internet World Statistics, August 5, 2016.

[84] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[85] Compared to 1 hour and 50 minutes in Iceland, which has the lowest television viewership. See: EBU Media Intelligence Service, “Europeans & Television: An Overview of TV Viewing Habits across Europe,” EBU, 2016.

[86] Office of the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “PIC Sintra Declaration: Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council” (May 30, 1997) and “PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-sustaining Structures” (October 12, 1997).

[87] The NATO Stabilization Force.

[88] For more, see, Monroe E. Price, “Information Intervention: Bosnia, the Dayton Accords, and the Seizure of Broadcasting Transmitters”, Cornell International Law Journal 33, no. 1 (2000).

[89] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 35.

[90] Johnson, Model Interventions, cited in Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 37.

[91] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 40.

[92] http://www.bhrt.ba/

[93] http://www.rtvfbih.ba/loc/ and http://www.federalna.ba/

[94] http://rtrs.tv/

[95] There are also 74 local TV and radio stations which are funded through municipal and cantonal budgets, but are not considered part of the PSB system. In total there are 4 cantonal TV stations, 8 municipality run TV stations, three cantonal and 59 municipality run radio stations, plus a radio station in Brčko. Information from Helena Mandić, director of broadcasting at the Communications Regulatory Agency, interview with author, March 2016.

[96] The Corporation was never established although it is envisaged by the Law on PSB System from 2005.

[97] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 36.

[98] Gotovuša remembers his attempt to influence the BBC team and to draw their attention toward the existence of radio and TV stations at the cantonal and municipality level, proposing that all should be incorporated into one system. “Personally, I believe they did not want to bother with that. All they wanted was to move away from the socialist model we had. And they left these cantonal and municipality broadcasters to exist, up until today, as mere mouthpieces of the political option at a given time over the territory.” Esad Gotovuša, interview with author, April 2016.

[99] Jusić and Ahmetašević, Media Reforms through Intervention, p. 36.

[100] Tarik Jusić and Amer Džihana, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Divided They Fall: Public Service Broadcasting in Multiethnic States, eds. Sandra Bašić-Hrvatin, Mark Thompson and Tarik Jusić (Sarajevo: Mediacentar, 2008), p. 101.

[101] Boyko Boev, Analysis of the Laws Pertaining to the Public Service Broadcasting System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, September 2012).

[102] “Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom sistemu Bosne i Hercegovine” [Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 78/05, entered into force November 8, 2005.

[103] Enforcement of this law is questionable given the nonexistence of the Corporation.

[104] “Zakon o javnom radiotelevizijskom servisu Bosne i Hercegovine” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina 92/05, entered into force December 28, 2005.

[105] “Zakon o Radioteleviziji Republike Srpske” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Republika Srpska], Official Gazette of RS 49/06, entered into force on May 11, 2006.

[106] “Zakon o Radioteleviziji Federacije BiH” [Law on Public Radio-Television Service of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina], Official Gazette of FBiH 48/08, entered into force on August 6, 2008.

[107] A public service broadcasting Corporation which was intended to coordinate the three distinct PSBs as well as “manage the equipment and the transmission network, and be in charge of sales and advertising.”

[108] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 6.

[109] Amer Džihana, editor at Analiziraj.ba and media analyst, interview with author, March 2016.

[110] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[111] Mehmed Halilović and Amer Džihana, eds., Media Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: Internews in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012), p. 192.

[112] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[113] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[114] There are reports that discuss the representation of the three constituent languages and whether or not they are adequately and equally represented by the various PSBs. However, no linguists participated in this research. See for example Radenko Udovičić, Tatjana Mrđa, and Aleksandra Mandić, Analiza programa tri javna TV servisa u periodu prime time: Ispoljavanje javne uloge - forma, sadržaj, ukloni [Analysis of programs of three public broadcasters during prime time: The manifestation of the public role: form, content, diffractions ] (Sarajevo: Media Plan Institute, July 2013).

[115] In 2015, monitoring by a local LGBT-focused NGO noted the utter lack of representation of this community in public media. See Dalibor Tanić, “Pozitivnija slika u bh. medijima o LGBT temama [More Positive Picture of LGBT Themes in Bosnian Media]”, LGBT.BA, July 20, 2015.

[116] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[117] Ibid.

[118] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS.

[119] Ibid.

[120] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[121] “Dom naroda PSBiH nije usvojio izvještaje vezane za BHRT [House of Peoples of Bosnia Rejects BHRT Reports],” Vecernji.ba, May 27, 2016.

[122] “Law on Public Radio-Television System of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 5, “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of RS,” Article 26.

[123] Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report”.

[124] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015, pp. 21-22.

[125] RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS, p. 100.

[126] Sanela Hodžić, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Media Integrity Matters: Reclaiming Public Service Values in Media and Journalism, ed. Brankica Petković (Ljubljana: Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies, 2014), p. 122.

[127] Hodžić, “Media Integrity Report”.

[128] Mirza Mušanović, “Zašto tone televizija Federacije BiH” [Why FTV is Sinking], Radio Feral, February 13, 2011.

[129] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[130] “EBU prolongirao rok za naplatu duga” [EBU Prolongs Deadline for Debt Payment], Teve.ba, June 2, 2016.

[131] BHRT, “Saopštenje Upravnog odbora” [Statement of the Steering Committee], June 30, 2016.

[132] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, p. 19.

[133] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[134] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[135] Data from the following reports: CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, p. 8, RTRS, Report on the Work of RTRS; BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[136] A temporary model to begin with, Parliament failed to agree on a new model before it expired.

[137] Zekerijah Smajić and Srećko Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse Mirrors Bosnia’s Own Decline”, Balkan Insight, March 2, 2016.

[138] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[139] For examples, see “Dodik pozvao građane RS na bojkot RTV takse” [Dodik called RS citizens to boycott RTV fee], Kliker, July 14, 2008; “50% građana BiH plaća RTV taksu” [50% of Bosnian citizens pay RTV fee], Teve.ba, March 27, 2015; Sanda Slato, “SDS-ova kampanja protiv plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS’s campaign against paying RTV fee], federalna.ba, May 26, 2012; “HDZ 1990 poziva na bojkot Telemacha i BHT-a zbog Edina Džeke!” [HDZ 1990 calls for a boycott of Telemach and BHT because of Edin Dzeko], ntv.ba, September 14, 2011; Oslobođenje, “Kožul: Ne plaćam RTV pretplatu kao ni većina Hrvata u BiH” [Kožul: Like most Croats in BiH, I don’t pay RTV fees!], jabuka.tv, May 20, 2015; “SDS i tzv. Savez za promjene pozvali na bojkot plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS and the so-called Association for Change call for a boycott of RTV fees], RTRS, January 22, 2016.

[140] BHRT, “Statement of the Steering Committee”.

[141] Smajić and Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse”.

[142] “To put it simply - the system is negligent.” Željko Bajić, Journalist at BH Radio 1 and trade union representative, interview with author, March 2016.

[143] CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH.

[144] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[145] Smajić and Latal, “Broadcasters’ Collapse”.

[146] Sanela Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Continuing Political Pressures and Obstructions”, Southeastern Europe Media Observatory, June 21, 2015.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[149] Audit Office for the Institutions of the Federation BiH, Izvještaj o reviziji finansijskih izvještaja javnog servisa ‘Radio-televizija Federacije BiH’ Sarajevo: na dan 31. 12. 2013. [Audit Report on Financial Reports of Public Service Broadcaster RTVFBiH] (Sarajevo: Audit Office for the Institutions of the Federation BiH, June 2014).

[150] “These figures show that at the public broadcasting services there is a lack of management engagement in collecting the license fee at RTVFBiH. This stems from the fact that there is a low level of outstanding fees being pursued through the courts, which, if collected, would further strengthen the financial position of the public service.” CRA, Analysis of the Broadcasting Market in BiH, Translation by authors.

[151] For examples, see: Dodik pozvao građane RS na bojkot RTV takse” [Dodik called RS citizens to boycott RTV fee], Kliker, July 14, 2008; “50% građana BiH plaća RTV taksu” [50% of Bosnian citizens pay RTV fee], Teve.ba, March 27, 2015; Sanda Slato, “SDS-ova kampanja protiv plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS’s campaign against paying RTV fee], federalna.ba, May 26, 2012; “SDS i tzv. Savez za promjene pozvali na bojkot plaćanja RTV takse” [SDS and the so-called Association for Change call for a boycott of RTV fees], RTRS, January 22, 2016.

[152] European Broadcasting Union, Director General’s Office, “Press Release: EBU Warns Bosnian Public Service Broadcaster is ‘Close to Collapse’”, May 19, 2015.

[153] “Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States” in the European Union, Council of the European Union, “Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts” (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, November 10, 1997).

[154] “Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o Radioteleviziji Republike Srpske” [Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Public Radio-Television Service of RS], Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 89/13.

[155] Emir Habul, “Javni RTV sistem u BiH - Korak do kolapsa” [The PSB System in BiH – a Step from Collapse], Media.ba , February19, 2016.

[156] Siniša Mihailović, general editor of RTRS, interview with author, March 2016.

[157] Uglješa Vuković, interview with author, March 2016.

[158] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[159] Boev, Analysis of the Laws.

[160] Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines”; also see: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015,” p. 9.

[161] “Members in all three broadcasters cannot perform the functions within legislative, executive or judicial power, nor can they hold membership in political parties (according to Rule 57/2011 on Public Radio and TV Broadcasters).” Hodžić, “Monitoring EU Guidelines,” p. 9.

[162] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 20.

[163] Initiative for Monitoring the European Integration of BiH, “Alternativni izvještaj o napretku 2015: politički kriteriji” [Alternative Progress Report 2016: Political Criteria] (Sarajevo, July 2015).

[164] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[165] “Kako Zlatko Lagumdžija uređuje Dnevnik FTV-a”, Klix.ba, March 4, 2012.

[166] “Bakir Hadžiomerović kandidat SDP-a za člana Predsjedništva BiH!” Slobodna Bosna, July 12, 2014.

[167] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[168] U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015”.

[169] Ibid.

[170] By analyzing the RTRS prime time news program, Gordana Katana notes that the leading political party in this entity dominates the program, while the president of this party remains the central figure of the prime time news. Gordana Katana, interview with author, March 2016. Opposition parties in RS, led by the SDS, the main opposition party, often point to SNSD control over RTRS. Some parties publicly incite people to boycott the license fee. See “SDS: SNSD preuzeo kontrolu nad RTRS-om” [SDS: SNSD has taken control of RTRS], Alternativna televizija, March 22, 2014; Gordana Katana, “RTRS: postupi po naređenju!” [RTRS: Do as ordered! ], Analiziraj.ba, February 27, 2016.

[171] “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Article 8; “Statut Radiotelevizije Bosne i Hercegovine [Statute of BHRT]”, Article 9; “Statut Radio-televizije Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine [Statute of RTVFBiH]”, Article 8; “Law on Public Radio-Television Service of Republika Srpska,” Article 13.

[172] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”.

[173] Tarik Jusić and Louis Kendall Palmer, “The Media and Power-Sharing: Towards an Analytical Framework for Understanding Media Policies in Post-Conflict Societies: Public Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Global Media Journal—Polish Edition 1, no. 4 (2008), p. 132.

[174] Davor Marko, ed., Informisanje na jezicima manjina na Zapadnom Balkanu: Sloboda, pristup, marginalizacija [Informing in minority languages in the Western Balkan: Freedom, acccess, marginalization ] (Sarajevo: Media plan institut, 2013), p. 132.

[175] See Peter Trudgill, Sociolingiustics, 4th ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2000), Snježana Kordić, Jezik i nacionalizam [Language and Nationalism] (Zagreb: Durieux 2010), and Ronelle Alexander, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian: A Grammar with Sociolinguistic Commentary (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

[176] Halilović and Džihana, Media Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 192.

[177] Tanić, “More Positive Picture”.

[178] Željka Lekić, Journalist and EBU representative in the Balkans, interview with author, March 2016.

[179] Hodžić and Pisker, “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, p. 20.

[180] European Audiovisual Observatory, “TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAVISE Database on TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services and Companies in Europe, 2015.

[181] The establishment of this body was based on conclusions and recommendations adopted during the conference “Introduction of digital television in Bosnia and Herzegovina” held on 30 March 2006 in Sarajevo.

[182] DTT Forum Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Strategija prelaska s analogne na digitalnu zemaljsku radiodifuziju u frekvencijskim opsezima 174-230 mhz i 470-862 mhz u Bosni i Herzegovini [The Strategy of Transition from Analogue to Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting in the Frequency Bands 174-230 MHz and 470-862 MHz in Bosnia and Herzegovina]”, June 17, 2009.

[183] Former secretary of the Digital Terrestrial Television (DTT) Forum, Emir Vajzović, told us that the strategy was well thought out, but that they encountered political difficulties: “Suddenly, new people were appointed to our working groups… we felt like the main problem was that the entire bureaucratic apparatus suddenly started working to prevent our work. Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[184] “Digitalni signal u BiH od 15 marta” [Digital Signal in BiH from 15 March], TeVe.ba, March 1, 2016.

[185] “Jusko: Digitalni signal od 29. septembra” [Jusko: Digital Signal from September 29], Teve.ba, September 21, 2016.

[186] Srna, “KONAČNO Javni RTV servisi u BiH počeli emitovanje digitalnog signala” [Finally, public broadcasters in BiH begin to broadcast digital signals], Blic, October 14, 2016.

[187] Fena, “Objavljen međunarodni tender za drugu fazu digitalizacije RTV servisa u BiH” [International tender announced for second phase of public broadcaster digitalization in BiH], Klix.ba, March 16, 2017.

[188] Former advisor to the Minister of Communications and Transport, Mehmed Agović, claimed that the RS insisted on owning the equipment refusing “to accept any reform which they saw as undermining their entity's powers and empowering a state-level public broadcasting system.” Nevertheless, those at RTRS see the situation differently. Siniša Mihailović of RTRS said that when, some years ago, RTRS obtained its own digitalization equipment and tested it from Kozara mountain, the CRA fined them. Mehmed Agović, interview with author, March 2016. Siniša Mihailović, interview with author, April 2016.

[189] Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[190] “To put it simply, nobody is responsible to anybody. Politicians are not responsible to the people, bureaucrats are not responsible to those who appoint them, and it all ends as a particular mix of laziness, irresponsibility, lack of expertise and in general, a trend wherein we talk more about less important things than about things that are relevant for our everyday lives. The result is that a potentially very good project, which was planned down to the last detail, just crashed, and nobody was considered responsible for that failure.” Emir Vajzović, interview with author, May 2016.

[191] Željka Lekić, interview with author, March 2016.

[192] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[193] BHRT, Report on the Work and Employment of Radio-Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015.

[194] Gordana Katana, interview with author, March 2016.

[195] RTRS: http://www.rtrs.tv/av/video.php

[196] “Development of technology is simply killing us”, Bajić said. “We cannot follow what is happening around the world, and I am afraid that we are arriving at the point where the young generations will not be able to recognize the technology we are using.” Željko Bajić, interview with author, March 2016.

[197] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Sanela Hodžić, interview with author, March 2016.

[200] Berend and Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe”.

[201] Jerzy Hausner and Mirosława Marody, eds, Jakość rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej: EU-monitoring IV [Quality of governance: Poland closer to the European Union: EU-monitoring IV] (Kraków: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2000).

[202] Berend and Bugarič, “Unfinished Europe”, p. 780.

[203] Jakubowicz, “Public Service Broadcasting: Product (and Victim?) of Public Policy”, p. 214.

[204] The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an Age of Anxiety (London etc.: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016).

[205] Voltmer, Building Media Systems in the Western Balkans, p. 14.

[206] “Postojanje BHRT-a ne smije biti upitno” [The existence of BHRT cannot be put into question] , Mediacentar Online (3 June 2016).

[207] In 2015 BHRT was in seventh place among nine measured public and commercial TV stations on the national level. See Aldin Arnautović, “A Decade of Failures: BHRT – Employee Surplus and Poor Results”, Mediacenter Online, September 6, 2016; and Aldin Arnautović, “A Decade of Failures: Public Broadcasting Service Owes Millions”, Mediacenter Online, September 2, 2016.

[208] Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1.

[209] Ibid.

[210] Sehl, Nielsen and Cornia, Public Service News and Digital Media, p. 5.

[a]Za Jasmina:

Ne mogu ovaj dio teksta da poravnam jer mi oznaka za fusnotu “pobjegne” na kraj reda. Nadam se da vi to možete popraviti?

[b]za jasmina, opet ne mogu poravnati

Contents

When can disparate treatment be justified? by Vanja Kovač

When can disparate treatment be justified? by Vanja Kovač

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical and Methodological Framework

3. Country Background

4. Research Findings on PBS: Key Issues

4.2. Funding Model of PSB

4.3. Politicization of the PSB

4.4 Socio-cultural Aspects of PSB

4.5. Technological Innovations and Digitalization

5. Concluding Remarks

6. Bibliography

About the Authors

Footnotes

3. Country Background

[180] European Audiovisual Observatory, “TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” MAVISE Database on TV and On-demand Audiovisual Services and Companies in Europe, 2015.